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Abstract
This article is focused on scal stimulus and exit strategies in a small euro area
economy. The analysis is based on a New-Keynesian general equilibrium model with
non-Ricardian features introduced in Almeida, Castro and F elix (2010). We dene
a benchmark scal stimulus and, conditional on alternative exit strategies, clarify its
macroeconomic eects. We investigate if a scal stimulus can be enhanced (or harmed)
by particular exit strategies. The impact multipliers proved insucient to discriminate
between alternative strategies. However, since the policy impacts are not limited to
the short run, there are relevant eects over the medium run that can be used to
evaluate the dierent strategies. It will be claimed that (i) the announcement of a
promptly and timely exit strategy, contemporaneous to the announcement of the scal
stimulus, with a consolidation period that is not prolonged indenitively, may improve
the eectiveness of the stimulus and that (ii) exit strategies based on Government
consumption cuts tend to dominate over other alternatives, such as transfers cuts or
tax rate increases.
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11 Introduction
The international nancial crisis raised fears of a global economic meltdown. The crisis,
which turned out to be severe, prolonged and imply demanding resource reallocations,
gained momentum since its outbreak in mid-2007, and led to abrupt declines in demand,
international trade and economic activity worlwide. The necessary adjustment to pro-
tracted and unpredictably large negative shocks was feared to aect not only each country
individually, but also the world economy, possibly creating new waves of harsh conse-
quences. The only natural comparison in history was the Great Depression in the 1930s.
The situation required a prompt action from policymakers.
Plans of scal and monetary stimulus were put forward worldwide in 2009. Besides
non-conventional monetary policy measures especially designed to deal with the height-
ened tensions in nancial markets, such as non-standard quantitative policies, monetary
authorities set intervention rates at historically low levels for a protracted period. In the
end of 2009, the targeted federal funds rate in the US was placed in the range 0:00 0:25
per cent, the main renancing xed rate in the euro area was set at 1.00 per cent, while
the overnight target rate in Japan was set to 0.30 per cent. In the same vein, scal au-
thorities adopted massive scal stimulus plans, put in place extraordinary Government
backed guarantees, and many of them intervened directly on nancial institutions, to
avoid bankruptcies and limit systemic risk. Fiscal imbalances increased well beyond those
merely implied by the operation of scal stabilisers. In 2009, Government debt increased
by several percentage points of GDP - not decimals -, and scal decits reached high
levels. In the Spring 2010 Economic Forecast, the European Commission (EC) reported
scal decit estimates for 2009-2010 above 10 per cent for the United States of America
(US) and the United Kingdom (UK), around 7 per cent for Japan, and above 6 per cent
for the euro area as a whole, gures well above historical averages even in recessionary
periods.
The stimulus plans brought monetary and scal policy actions to the center stage of
an intense debate. It was important to assess the eectiveness of the stimulus measures
in taming the collapse of the nancial system and the economic activity meltdown at a
global scale, and to evaluate the role of exit strategies, in a context in which it was not
clear at times that private demand would hold autonomously, at least in some advanced
economies (IMF 2010). While the liquidity provided by central banks will need to be
absorbed as extraordinary lending operations mature, scal consolidation measures will
have to be implemented to halt the upward trend in public debt to GDP ratios. The
building up of scal imbalances and the lack of clear exit strategies was among the main
factors that raised doubts on the ability of some euro area economies to honour their
public debt services and triggered a surge in sovereign debt spreads, making it clear that
scal consolidation measures will have to be adopted in more vulnerable economies.
This article is focused on the role of exit strategies in a small euro area economy.
Our concern is twofold. Firstly, a number of small euro area economies has been under
2pressure from nancial markets since late 2009, when it became evident that large scal
imbalances were inevitable and that there was no clear exit strategy. Secondly, scal
policy is the only tool that domestic authorities can use to smooth adverse idiosyncratic
shocks, implying that regaining the margin of manoeuvre is crucial to restore a sound
macroeconomic framework.
The discussion is based on PESSOA, a New-Keynesian model introduced in Almeida,
Castro and F elix (2010), whose structure draws on several contributions, notably Kumhof,
Muir, Mursula and Laxton (2010). The model was designed and calibrated to t the
characteristics of a small open economy (SOE) integrated in a monetary union. The SOE
structure implies that foreign variables (which correspond to the rest of the monetary
union), namely foreign interest rates, output and prices, are assumed to be orthogonal
to domestic developments, as in Adolfson, Lase en, Lind e and Villani (2007). Hence, the
stability of the model is granted by the full credibility of the ination objective and by the
large elasticities of real trade variables to real exchange rate uctuations, since domestic
price levels are pinned down by the external constraint that sets a unique steady-state
real exchange rate. To use an expression from Giavazzi and Pagano (1988), the SOE in
PESSOA is eectively \tying its hands" with the rest of the euro area.
Contrary to most DSGE models in the literature on SOE, PESSOA is intrinsically
non-Ricardian, featuring nite-lifetime households, following Blanchard (1985) and Yaari
(1965), distortionary taxation and a share of liquidity constrained households, in line
with Gal , L opez-Salido and Vall es (2007). These features, coupled with a rich scal
block, make the model particularly suited to analyse scal policy issues. In particular,
the nite-lifetime framework creates a non-trivial role for scal policy over the medium
and long run, introducing a source of non-Ricardian behaviour absent in the workhorse
innitely-lived agents environment. In addition, the Blanchard-Yaari framework allows
for the endogenous determination of the net foreign asset position (Harrison, Nikolov,
Quinn, Ramsay, Scott and Thomas 2005), thereby delivering a more realistic co-movement
between public debt and the net foreign asset position, in contrast with the innitely lived
agents case (Schmitt-Grohe and Uribe 2003).
The contribution of this article is to assess the macroeconomic impacts, in the context
of a Blanchard-Yaari framework, of alternative exit strategies in a small-euro area economy.
We highlight the importance of announcing the exit strategy contemporaneously to the
announcement of the stimulus package, and analyse the impact of considering alternative
scal instruments to ensure not only a sustainable public debt path, but also a timely
and promptly scal consolidation period. In addition, we analyse alternative timings and
intensities to start the exit strategy, under the assumption of perfect foresight and full
credibility of the scal authority.
The structure of the article is as follows. In section 2, we motivate the article and
survey the literature. The model is presented in section 3, along with the calibration
strategy. Section 4 addresses the impact of alternative instruments and of dierent exit
timings on the main macroeconomic aggregates. Section 5 concludes and puts forward
3some policy implications.
2 Motivation
The scal activism to cope with the economic crisis, in combination with the operation
of automatic stabilisers, led to major imbalances in advanced economies. In many coun-
tries, structural imbalances in the public sector clearly exceeded the announced stimulus
packages. These developments were particularly worrisome in economies that already had
ongoing long-run sustainability issues, namely due to structural features such as ageing
and its future impacts in social security outlays or developments in health expenditures.
According to the European Commission (EC) projection of Spring 2010, public debt
stocks are projected to climb in several countries, between 2008 and 2011, by not less than
20 pp. (Figure 1), while scal decits are not anticipated to be reverted visibly before
2011 (Figure 2). In this context, scal consolidation issues emerge naturally at the policy
debate forefront and are high on the policymakers agenda, in particular in the euro area,
where the generosity of public pensions and health care systems may be facing more risks
than before the outbreak of the international economic crisis.
Both the EC and the European Central Bank (ECB) have made public statements
that highlight the importance of exit strategies and long-term sustainability. For instance,
the President of the ECB claried the problem as follows:
\[M]any euro area governments are faced with high and sharply rising scal
imbalances. If not addressed by a clear and credible exit strategy, this could
seriously risk undermining public condence in the sustainability of public
nances and the economic recovery.1"
This view is aligned with the one expressed in EC (2009), according to which:
\[F]iscal measures to increase condence and support demand are only suc-
cessful if they are perceived by the markets and public opinion as temporary
and consistent with long-term sustainability" (p. 53).
In short, the announcement of a clear and adequate scal consolidation strategy seems
in fact part of any sustainable and credible scal stimulus package. This is the main
focus of this article. The main questions are: what is the best exit strategy from a scal
stimulus programme for a SOE operating in a monetary union? Is there a dominant scal
instrument to ground the consolidation? How much does the timing and the intensity of
the consolidation matter?
The scal package herein considered is assumed to be fully credible and temporary
and the exit strategy is presumably well-dened. In particular, the assumption of full
credibility of the scal authorities ensures that the sovereign risk premium is unaected
1Jean-Claude Trichet, Frankfurt am Main, 5 November 2009, available at
http://www.ecb.int/press/pressconf/2009/html/is091105.en.html






















































































































































Source: EC (Spring 2010 forecasts). Annual data.
by the implementation of the scal stimulus package as well as by the corresponding
exit strategy.2. In addition, the temporary nature of the stimulus is also crucial, since
permanent scal expansions (a permanent increase in government expenditure, for in-
stance) create sizeable negative wealth eects, undermining medium-run economic growth
prospects and, in extreme cases, backre the initial intentions of the scal authorities.
Finally, an adequate exit strategy that ensures scal sustainability is a key factor behind
the behaviour of nancial markets participants. If sustainability concerns arise, this aects
2For an assessment of the impacts in the case of limited credibility please refer to Almeida, Castro,
F elix and Maria (2010), in which it is pointed out that limited credibility reduces the scal multipliers in
a SOE operating in a monetary union.
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Source: Thomson Reuters. Daily data up to 2010, July,15 (moving average of previous
90 days).
Note: The sovereign debt spread is calculated as the dierence between 10-years Gov-
ernment bond yields of each country and Germany.
the credibility of the scal authorities and tends to translate into sovereign debt spread
hikes, jeopardising the full credibility assumption. This was likely the case in some euro
area economies, namely Greece and to a smaller extent Ireland, Portugal, Spain and Italy
(Figure 3). Therefore, these recent developments put in evidence that participation in a
monetary union is not a bulletproof credibility vest. Indeed, even within a monetary union
framework, nancial market participants may discriminate economies revealing larger im-
balances and more fragile budgetary perspectives. Hence, any exit strategy should be
designed so as to avoid damaging credibility and pressuring risk premium upwards.
There is mounting literature on exit strategies and scal consolidation. Coenen, Mohr
and Straub (2008) discuss scal consolidation strategies in the euro area using a two coun-
try open-economy model (Coenen, McAdam and Straub 2007) and assess the macroeco-
nomic impact of a permanent decline in public debt ratio using both expenditure and
revenue based strategies. The results suggest that scal consolidation has positive long-
run impacts on key macroeconomic aggregates, in particular when the improved budgetary
position is used to cut distortionary taxes in the nal steady-state. Corsetti, Meier and
M uller (2009) address the role of spending reversals in the context of a temporary scal
stimulus and conclude that the impact of scal stimulus depends on expectations about
future consolidation strategies, and that consolidation based on spending cuts increased
the adherence to time series evidence for the US. Leeper, Plante and Traum (2009) use an
estimated DSGE model for US that includes a rich set of scal instruments to respond to
the evolution of debt and nd that the impact of scal policy shocks in the main macroeco-
nomic aggregates may dier substantially from models only allowing for non-distortionary
taxes. Moreover, it is pointed out that impact multipliers of debt-nanced scal stim-
ulus can dier substantially from long-term multipliers. Kumhof, Clinton, Mursula and
6Laxton (2010) use a multi-country DSGE model with nitely-lived agents to show that a
well-targeted scal consolidation is likely to foster economic growth in the medium and
long run and illustrate the relevance of the credibility of the scal authorities in reducing
the short-run costs of the scal consolidation. Finally, Caprioli, Rizza and Tommasino
(2010) provide formal theoretical rationale, in a DSGE model, to the policy advices of
international institutions that call for a substantial and fast debt reduction. The results
are confronted with those of the mainstream optimal scal policy literature that calls for
debt stabilization. If debt holders fear a government default, the article shows that an
increase in debt, followed by scal consolidation, is the optimal scal policy to nance an
exogenous stream of public expenditure.
Against this background, this paper is a contribution to the discussion of exit strate-
gies in several fronts. Unlike most of the research on scal stimulus, which is based on
the innitely-lived agents framework featuring liquidity constrained households, we use
an intrinsically non-Ricardian DSGE model with nitely lived households (Kumhof and
Laxton 2009b). In addition, the discussion of alternative exit strategies addressed at boost-
ing credibility of the temporary nature of the scal stimulus may alert policymakers in
the sense that expectations' management might be as important as the stimulus strategy
itself.
3 A model for a small euro area economy
This section presents PESSOA, the New-Keynesian dynamic general equilibrium model
behind the analysis of the macroeconomic impacts of a scal stimulus. The model was
introduced and calibrated for Portugal in Almeida, Castro and F elix (2010) and used to
analyse shocks that hit the Portuguese economy over the last decade in Almeida, Castro
and F elix (2009). It can however be easily re-calibrated to t the characteristics of any
other small euro area economy. The model has intrinsic non-Ricardian features largely
inspired in the IMF's Global Integrated Monetary and Fiscal model presented in Kumhof,
Muir, Mursula and Laxton (2010). The current setup was enhanced to allow for richer scal
policy simulations. The SOE structure implies assuming that the rest of the monetary
union is not aected by domestic shocks. This is tantamount to say that union aggregates
and, therefore, monetary policy decisions are orthogonal to developments in the SOE, as
in Adolfson et al. (2007).
It is well known that breaking the Ricardian equivalence is of paramount importance
to generate realistic impulse response functions of private consumption in the advent of
a scal shock (Blanchard 1985, Gal  et al. 2007). Contrary to most DSGE models in
the literature on SOE, PESSOA is intrinsically non-Ricardian, featuring: nitely-lived
households in line with the stochastic lifetime framework proposed by Blanchard (1985)
and Yaari (1965); distortionary taxation on households consumption, labour and capital
income; and liquidity constrained households as in Gal  et al. (2007). The scal block of
the model is rich enough to account for several types of distortionary taxation, lump-sum
7transfers to households (to all or to a targeted group), and government expenditure.
This setup generates a non-trivial role for scal policy not only in the short-run but also
in the medium and long-run. As claried in Frenkel and Razin (1996) and in Kumhof and
Laxton (2009b), the nitely lived agents framework implies that households discount future
events at a higher rate than the Government (the so-called over-discounting behaviour).
This creates sizeable wealth eects of public debt, which are absent in the workhorse
innitely-lived agent framework. In particular, households strongly prefer debt issuance
to tax nancing of Government expenditure, since they attach a positive probability to the
fact that they might not be around in the future when taxes required to meet debt issued
today are levied. It should be mentioned that technically it is not the event that current
generations will die that generates the non-Ricardian eect, but rather the fact that future
generations will bear some of the tax burden (Buiter 1988). In addition, the Blanchard-
Yaari framework allows for the endogenous determination of the net foreign asset (NFA)
position (Harrison et al. 2005), since in a nite lifetime the amount of assets/debt that
a household can accumulate is inevitably limited by life expectancy.3 This represents an
appealing feature for the simulation of permanent scal shocks, since it generates a positive
correlation between public debt and the net foreign debt position of the economy. On
the contrary, in the workhorse innitely lived agents model, the steady-state net foreign
asset position is pinned down exogenously (Schmitt-Grohe and Uribe 2003), implying
that changes in steady-state public debt are fully oset by private saving and are, by
assumption, uncorrelated with the net foreign debt.
Since PESSOA is designed for a SOE integrated in a monetary union, the adjustment
mechanism of the economy to domestic shocks is rather dierent from the standard setup,
in which monetary policy and real interest rate movements are crucial to render the model
dynamically stable. In PESSOA, monetary policy is trivial in the sense that the domestic
interest rate is orthogonal to domestic shocks and can only deviate from the rest of the
union rate by a risk premium that is assumed to be exogenous. This implies that domestic
shocks aecting domestic ination developments tend to generate powerful eects on the
real interest rate, amplifying the uctuations of the economy. The dynamic stability of
the model is ensured instead by an active role of the real exchange rate (which in the case
of an irrevocably xed nominal exchange rate simply reects the relative price of domestic
goods vs. foreign goods), in the adjustment of international trade in goods and assets.
Domestic agents in PESSOA are assumed to only trade in goods and assets/debt with
agents in the monetary union. Therefore, real exchange rate uctuations have sizeable
impacts on competitiveness, trade and thus in the net foreign asset/debt position of the
economy. This position is pinned down in the steady state by the foreign asset/debt level
constraint and its impact in households nancial wealth (and, ultimately, in consumption).
Since foreign prices developments are assumed to be independent of domestic shocks, the
3It should pointed out that by denition a SOE does not aect the world investment-savings balance
and, therefore, the world real interest rate. Hence, innitely lived agents will be able to borrow or lend
in innite amounts that can be paid or received in the indenite future. For further details refer to Barro
and Sala-i-Martin (1995).
8real exchange rate pins down uniquely the domestic price level.
Finally, PESSOA features a number of nominal and real rigidities that give rise to
realistic short-run impacts. On the nominal side, there is dierentiation in the labour
and product markets, allowing for monopolistic competition and staggered wage and price
ination. On the real side, the model incorporates external habit formation in consumption
and adjustment costs on investment and import contents.
The model is populated by households, which will be presented in detail in subsection
3.1; unions, presented in subsection 3.2; and rms (intermediate goods producers and nal
goods producers), which will be presented in subsection 3.3. These agents interact with a
Government, which is described in subsection 3.4. The rest of the world, corresponding to
the rest of the monetary union, is presented in subsection 3.5, while the market clearing
conditions are presented in subsection 3.6. The model calibration is claried in subsection
3.7.
3.1 Households
Households evolve in line with the overlapping generations scheme rst proposed in Blan-
chard (1985). All of them have a nite lifetime, facing an instant probability of death 1 
in each period ( is the probability of surviving between two consecutive periods), which is
constant throughout life, independent of age and equal for all households.4 However, the
overall size of the population is assumed to remain constant and equal to N households,
implying that in each period N(1 ) households die and the same number of households
is born. In addition, two types of households coexist: type A, the asset holders, who can
access asset markets and perform both intra and inter-temporal optimisation, smoothing
out their consumption over lifetime by trading assets; and type B, the liquidity constrained
households that do not access asset markets and are, therefore, not allowed to engage in
inter-temporal optimisation, consuming all of their income in each and every period as in
Gal  et al. (2007). The share of type B households is assumed to be  , implying that in
each period there coexist N(1  ) households holding assets and N  liquidity constrained
households.
A representative household of type H 2 fA;Bg with age a derives utility from con-
sumption, CH
a;t, and leisure, 1   LH
a;t, according to a CRRA utility function (with LH
a;t




















4The probability of an individual dying after t periods of life is equal to (1   )
t 1 and the expected
life horizon at any point in time is equal to (1   )
 1. Probability 1    can also be interpreted as a
probability of \economic death" or a degree of \myopia" (Blanchard 1985, Frenkel and Razin 1996, Harrison
et al. 2005, Bayoumi and Sgherri 2006). It represents the inverse of the average planning horizon of the
household, which is likely to be far more shorter than its biologic lifetime. Bayoumi and Sgherri (2006)
present econometric evidence for the US.
9where Et is the expectation operator, 0    1 stands for the standard time discount
factor,  > 0 is the coecient of risk aversion and 0  H  1 is a distribution parameter.
HabH
t represents external habits, dened in per capita terms as

CA





v for type A and B households, respectively, with parameter 0  v  1
controlling for the degree of habit persistence.5
Households of type A save in both domestic and foreign government bonds, Ba;t and
B
a;t, which yield gross nominal interest rates it and i
t, respectively, from period t to period
t + 1 (by convention, interest is paid at the beginning of period t + 1). Domestic public
debt is assumed to be solely held by domestic agents (full home bias). Besides returns
from nancial assets, these households also receive labour income, earning a wage rate, Wt,
adjusted by the household's age-specic productivity level, a = ka, where k is a scaling
factor and 0    1 is the labour productivity rate of decay per period that mimics
life-cycle prole. Furthermore, they receive dividends from rms and from labour unions
(the later reect a wage premia that will be motivated later on). These are represented by
DA
a;t(x) where x can be: the intermediate goods producers of tradable (T ) and non-tradable
goods (N); the nal goods producers of private consumption (C), government consumption
(G), capital (I), or export goods (X); or labour unions (U). Finally, households are taxed
by the Government in their consumption and labour activities by C;t and L;t, respectively,




The asset holders' optimisation problem consists in setting the path of consumption,
labour, domestic and foreign asset holdings, that maximises (1) subject to the following
budget constraint:
PtCA



















where Pt = (1+C;t)PC
t , the after-tax price of the nal consumption good, is the numeraire
price of the economy and PC
t is the before-tax price of the nal consumption good.
Type A households are not indierent between government expenditure nancing with
tax levies or debt issuance (which corresponds to future taxes). They strongly prefer debt
issuance and take part of government bond holdings as net wealth. This non-Ricardian
feature results essentially from nite lifetime and is amplied by the life-cycle income pro-
le due to declining lifetime productivity. The intuition is that if government expenditure
is nanced with debt issuance, a nite lifetime household will hold part of this debt, but
may not be around at the time taxes are levied, implying that part of the debt can be used
to nance private consumption expenditures during lifetime, instead of being used to face
5Aggregation across generations is made possible by assuming that habits are multiplicative instead of
additive. However, it should be recognised that this generates a low habit persistence.
10future tax payments. These eects are magnied by the fact that the labour income tax
represents an important part of overall tax revenue. The life-cycle prole implies that even
if a household is alive at the time taxes are levied, it can be at very low productivity and
wage levels, which reduces its labour income tax payments. Finite lifetimes and life-cycle
income prole create households relatively more short-term oriented, as they over-discount
future events.
For type B households, the lack of access to assets/debt market implies that the inter-
temporal optimisation problem collapses to an intra-temporal optimisation problem (due
to the impossibility of shifting consumption across periods by trading in assets). These
households merely choose consumption and labour that maximise their instant utility
introducing an additional layer of non-Ricardian behavior that is crucial to obtain realistic
short-run responses of consumption to scal stimulus (Gal  et al. 2007). Therefore, shocks
occurring in a given period are totally reected in the budget constraint of that period
and create powerful income eects.
The optimisation problem of liquidity constrained households is then to maximise (1)
subject to the following budget constraint:
PtCB
a;t  WtaLB




where all variables have the interpretation previously dened for asset holders.
The households utility maximisation problem delivers a condition for each type of
household that yields their optimal consumption-leisure allocation, the consumption func-
tion, which depends on wealth in the case of asset holders and on per-period income in
the case of liquidity constrained households, and a degenerated interest rate parity con-
dition. The consumption function expresses consumption as a function of human and
nancial wealth. Human wealth corresponds to the expected present discounted value of
labour supply endowments and dividend income, while nancial wealth is composed by
the households' current domestic and foreign asset holdings. The interest rate parity con-
dition denes the equilibrium in the bonds market and essentially implies that domestic




There is a continuum of labour unions in the economy, indexed by h 2 [0;1], who buy
the homogeneous labour from households and transform it into dierent varieties, Ut(h).
The labour dierentiation scheme gives market power to each union over its respective
variety, allowing it to charge manufacturers a wage, Vt(h), higher than the one paid to
households. The dierent varieties are then combined to produce a labour bundle, Ut(j),
sold to manufacturer j at an aggregate wage, Vt, higher than Wt. This wedge reects
the fact that manufacturers pay a higher price for Ut(j), as it incorporates dierentiated
labour inputs, contrary to the labour supplied by households.
11Each manufacturer demands a certain quantity of all varieties of labour to be included








where 0  U;t  1 is the elasticity of substitution across dierent varieties of labour,
which determines the degree of union h market power, i.e., the markup charged over the
wage paid to households in the steady state.
The wage-setting process is costly, with abrupt union wage (Vt(h)) changes being more
costly than smooth wage adjustments. This is implemented by assuming that labour
unions incur in wage adjustment costs,  U
t (h). In the spirit of Ireland (2001) and Laxton












where U is the adjustment cost parameter and Tt is the level of the labour-augmenting
technical progress, which enters as a scaling factor, ensuring that adjustment costs do not
vanish along the balanced growth path.












rt+l 1 for s > 0
(1 for s = 0) stands for the subjective real discount factor and rt = it
e
t+1 is the real interest
rate, with e
t+1 being the numeraire good expected ination rate. Period t dividends,
DU
t (h), are dened as:
DU
t (h) = (1   L;t)





It should be noted that usually households directly provide the dierentiated services
and explore the corresponding market power in New-Keynesian general equilibrium mod-
els, while wages are subject to a staggered adjustment process  a la Calvo in line with
Erceg, Henderson and Levin (2000), in many cases with indexation, as in Smets and
Wouters (2007) and Altig, Christiano, Eichenbaum and Linde (2005). This is not the
case in the model used herein. Such option creates heterogenous labour and wages across
households that can jeopardise aggregation in a model with an overlapping generations
environment and a life-cycle income prole (since it increases the degree of wage hetero-
geneity across cohorts already in place due to the life-cyle income prole). Therefore,
to keep the model tractable, the dierentiated wage-setting problem is performed by the
union, as in Kumhof, Muir, Mursula and Laxton (2010), while wage stickiness is modelled
12as in (5).
3.3 Firms
The production block of the model features two types of rms: manufacturers, who pro-
duce intermediate goods, and distributors, who produce nal goods. Manufacturers com-
bine labour and capital to produce dierent varieties of tradable (T ) and non-tradable (N)
intermediate goods. Labour is purchased from unions, while capital is obtained through
the accumulation of new capital goods (investment) bought from the respective distribu-
tor. The intermediate goods are then sold to distributors, who combine them with imports
to produce a dierentiated nal good variety. There are four types of nal goods: con-
sumer goods (C); new capital goods (I); government consumption goods (G) and export
goods (X), which dier in its content of tradable, non-tradable and imported goods.
Manufacturers
For each type of intermediate good J 2 fT ;Ng there is a continuum of manufacturing
rms j 2 [0;1]. Each rm produces a dierent variety of the good, ZJ
t (j), using capital,
KJ
t (j), and labour, UJ
t (j), as inputs. It sells its good at price PJ
t (j), which is higher than
the marginal cost, reecting the market power generated by product dierentiation.

























where 0  ZJ  1 is the elasticity of substitution between capital and labour in sector J;
0  J
U  1 is the quasi-labour income share; AJ
t is a stationary sector-specic technology
shock; Tt is a labour-augmenting technical progress, assumed to evolve deterministically
at a constant exogenous rate g, such that Tt=Tt 1 = g.
To accumulate capital, manufacturers invest, IJ
t (j), subject to a standard capital ac-
cumulation condition:
KJ
t+1(j) = (1   J)KJ
t (j) + IJ
t (j) (9)
where 0  J  1 is a sector-specic depreciation rate.
In order to obtain a smooth response of production factor quantities to changes in
their desired level, investment and labour are subject to quadratic real adjustment costs,
 IJ
t (j) and  UJ





























13where IJ and UJ determine how costly is to change investment and labour services for
rms in sector J; and IJ
t and UJ
t are aggregate investment and labour, respectively.
Furthermore, in order to obtain a realistic short-run behaviour of intermediate goods
price ination, quadratic adjustment costs,  PJ


















where PJ determines how costly is to adjust prices for rms operating in sector J; ZJ
t is
the aggregate output of sector J, which is sold to distributors at the price PJ
t .
Each distributor demands a certain quantity of each variety of type J intermediate
good, by solving a standard cost minimisation problem. Aggregating across distributors,











where 0  J;t  1 is the elasticity of substitution between type J good varieties.












subject to the constraints imposed by the production technology, capital accumulation
condition, adjustment costs and demand conditions. Period t dividends, DJ
t (j), are dened
as:
DJ











t (j) + PI
t IJ
t (j) + PI
t  IJ
t (j) + Vt UJ
t (j) + PJ
t  PJ




t (j) corresponding to overall revenue, (1 + SP;t)VtUJ
t (j) being labour costs
inclusive of employer social security contributions (SP;t is presented below in subsection
3.4), and PI
t IJ
t (j) standing for investment spending, where PI
t is the price of new capital
goods. The term PI
t  IJ
t (j) + Vt UJ
t (j) + PJ
t  PJ
t (j) includes costs related with price
adjustments and with changes in the quantities of labour and capital used. Finally, a real
xed cost term, !J, scaled by the technological progress and by the output price level,
PJ
t Tt!J, is used to ensure that economic prots arising from monopolistic competition are
largely depleted in the steady state and, therefore, there are no rms entering or leaving
14the market.6
A dividend income tax, K;t, is charged on Net operational prot, which diers from
Operational cashow by the fact that capital depreciation is tax rebatable, but investment






t (j) + PI
t qJ
t JKJ
t (j) + PI
t  IJ
t (j) + Vt UJ
t (j) + PJ
t  PJ
t (j) + PJ
t Tt!J
where qJ
t is the shadow price of a unit of installed capital in terms of new capital goods
(Tobin's-Q).
Distributors
For each type of nal good F 2 fC;G;I;Xg there is a continuum of distributors f 2 [0;1].
Each type of nal good is demanded by a unique type of costumer: consumer goods (C) are
demanded by households, new capital goods (I) are demanded by manufacturing rms,
government consumption goods (G) are demanded by the Government, and export goods
(X) are demanded by foreign costumers. Distributors sell their goods at price PF
t (f),
which already incorporates a markup over the marginal costs.
Each distributor uses a two-stage production technology. In the rst stage, the distrib-
utor combines domestic tradable goods, ZT F
t (f), with imported goods, MF
t (f), to obtain
Y AF
t (f), which is an assembled good of variety f; in the second stage, the distributor com-
bines the assembled good with domestic non-tradable goods, ZNF
t (f), to produce variety
f of the nal good, Y F
t (f), which is then sold to its costumers. The production technology
is formalised as a sector-specic nested CES technology.


























where 0  AF  1 is the elasticity of substitution between the domestic and the imported
tradable goods; 0  AF  1 is a home bias parameter; and  AF
t (f) stands for a real
adjustment cost on changes in variety f import content, MF
t (f)=Y AF






















where AF is a sector-specic adjustment cost parameter; MF
t and Y AF
t represent aggre-
gate imports and assembled goods, respectively.























6The xed cost term is dened as a constant share of nominal output, ensuring that it does not vanish
along the inationary balanced growth path of the economy.
15where 0  F  1 is the elasticity of substitution between assembled and non-tradable
goods, and 0  F  1 is the non-tradable goods bias parameter.
As in the case of labour unions and manufacturers, distributors also face quadratic
costs in the adjustment of the nal good price,  PF

















where PF is the sector-specic price adjustment cost parameter; Y F
t is the aggregate
output of nal good F, to be sold at price PF
t .











where 0  F;t  1 is the elasticity of substitution between type F good varieties.












subject to the constraints imposed by the production technology, adjustment costs and
demand conditions. Period t dividends, DF
t (j), are dened as:
DF




t (f)   PT
t ZT F
t (f)   PN
t ZNF
t (f)   P
t MF
t (f)   PF
t  PF
t (f)   PF
t Tt!F
which corresponds to the after-tax dierence between overall revenue PF
t (f)Y F
t (f) and






t (f), and adjustment
and xed costs, PF
t (f) PF
t (f) + PF
t (f)Tt!F. Finally, P
t is the price of imported goods,
MF
t (f), set in the rest of the world market.
3.4 The Government
The scal block of the model is detailed enough to allow for the assessment of macroeco-
nomic impacts of alternative scal policy strategies. Government has a number of scal
instruments that can be used to stabilise the business cycle that aect macroeconomic ag-
gregates dierently. In addition, Government may also nance current expenditure using
future tax revenues by managing a public debt stock. The disaggregation considered for
the public sector account is illustrated in Table 1.
On the expenditure side, the government faces spending with: the government con-
sumption good, PG
t Gt (recall that PG
t is the price charged by distributors for the gov-
ernment consumption good); lump-sum transfers to households, TRGt; and debt interest
outlays, (it 1   1)Bt 1, where Bt 1 are one-period bonds which pay an interest rate
it 1 at the beginning of period t. On the revenue side, the government receives funds
from: foreign transfers from the rest of the world, TREt; the labour income tax paid on





; the tax paid by households on consumption
expenditures, RVC;t = C;tPC
t Ct; employers' social security contributions due on payroll,
RVSP;t = SPVtUt; corporate income taxes paid by rms (both manufacturers and distrib-









































In addition, the Government issues one-period bonds, paying interest outlays at the
beginning of period t on the stock held from period t   1, it 1Bt 1. For the sake of sim-
plicity, full home bias is assumed, i.e. all government debt is held by domestic households.
However, households can access international debt markets and borrow abroad to buy the
government bonds.
It should be noted that the Government nances its expenditure mostly through dis-
tortionary taxation (present or future). In particular, higher taxation on labour income
and/or higher social security contributions rate induce households to substitute consump-
tion for leisure and/or manufacturers to use technologies with higher capital intensity. In
addition, an increase in the consumption tax rate also induces households to substitute
away from consumption.
The issuance of public debt allows for the postponement of charging the taxes required
to nance expenditure in each period, implying that the public sector account does not
need to balance out in each and every period. This has a non-trivial impact in households
decisions, since the model is inherently non-Ricardian and, therefore, part of the public
debt is taken as net wealth by asset holders.
The Government's budget constraint can be represented as:
Bt = it 1Bt 1 + PG
t Gt + TRGt   RVt   TREt (21)
where RVt =
P
A=C;L;SP;K RVA;t are overall revenues.
To ensure that the public debt follows a non-explosive path, a scal policy rule is
Table 1: Simplied public sector account
Expenditures Revenues
Govt. Consumption PG
t Gt Consumption tax RVC;t
Transfers TRGt Soc. Sec. Contributions RVSP;t
Interest Payments (it 1   1)Bt 1 Labour income tax RVL;t
Corporate income tax RVK;t
Foreign transfers TREt
Fiscal balance  (Bt   Bt 1)
17featured, imposing that public debt and the scal balance (henceforth SGt = Bt 1   Bt)









t , which is also
a key steady-state gure. For each period, the scal rule sets the scal balance that is
consistent with a stable debt path, imposing that the budget constraint is binding and at
least one of the scal instruments must adjust endogenously to full it. Following Kumhof

































t is overall tax revenue with tax bases evaluated at their steady-state levels;
GDPt and GDPss
t are the observed and the steady-state levels of Gross Domestic Product.
The convergence dynamics, namely the speed of convergence and the response to business
cycle uctuations, depend on the scal rule parameters. Parameter d1 controls for the
response to the tax revenue gap, while d2 controls for the Government (in)tolerance to
deviations of debt from the target ratio. Since these gaps vanish in the steady state, the
rule implies that the scal balance converges to its target level.
At this point, the scal instrument that becomes an endogenous variable remains
to be dened. This is an open scal policy decision and is largely a political matter.
Ex-ante, the government has the following scal instruments: government consumption
(Gt), lump-sum transfers to households (TRGt) (which can be targeted at asset holders
or liquidity constrained households), the labour income tax rate (L;t), the consumption
tax rate (C;t), the employer's social security contributions rate (SP) and the corporate
income tax rate (K;t)7. However, ex-post one of this instruments is endogenously adjusted
to met the scal balance imposed by the scal rule.8 The most common option relies on
the use of the labour income tax rate as the endogenous scal policy instrument (Harrison
et al. 2005, Kilponen and Ripatti 2005, Kumhof, Muir, Mursula and Laxton 2010, Kumhof
and Laxton 2007). The benchmark specication of PESSOA also takes this option, but
it allows for other possibilities, including not only the remaining taxes, but also transfers
to households or Government consumption. In addition, it is also possible to consider
alternative combinations of instruments.
Finally, a word of caution is needed. Although the above-mentioned scal block is
suited to implement several types of scal simulations, the model remains a simplica-
tion of reality that is crucial to keep it tractable. In particular, government consumption
represents a pure distortion, since it does not aect the marginal utility of consumption
and leisure or rms productivity level. Therefore, the only tangible impact of Govern-
ment consumption is changing demand conditions for a specic type of nal good, which
is particulary intensive in non-tradable intermediate goods and has a negligible import
7The distinction between government consumption and investment is not considered in the model.
8In many studies, the budget constraint is simplied to include a non-distortionary lump-sum tax.
Though it may be an appealing academic benchmark, it is largely unrealistic since the role played by
lump-sum taxation is very limited.
18content. The model is thus silent to other roles of the Government, for instance as em-
ployer or investor. If Government purchases includes more spending on law enforcement,
road buildings or other public stock with likely future eects, these are not considered.
As Hall (2009) claries, it is not the case that eects operating through externalities are
unimportant, but simply that the scal stimulus has to be undertaken as an experiment on
a limited and controlled macroeconomic environment. It is beyond the scope of this paper
to dene externalities' eects conditional on dierent scal policies. Note also that the
model does not feature unemployment benets explicitly, since labour market details are
reduced to the minimum and, therefore, unemployment developments are not explicitly
modelled.
3.5 The rest of the world
By assumption the rest of the world (RoW) corresponds to the rest of the monetary union,
and therefore the nominal eective exchange rate is irrevocably set to unity, as all trade
and nancial ows are in the same currency.
Regarding nancial ows, it is assumed that changes in the net foreign asset/debt
position of the domestic economy have no impact on foreign macroeconomic aggregates
and therefore on monetary policy decisions. As for trade ows, the demand for imports by
domestic distributors results from the dividend maximisation problem presented in section
3.3 and reects demand conditions and competitiveness. Concerning exports, let Y A
t (f)
be the good demanded by a continuum f 2 [0;1] of importers located abroad. This
good is assumed to result from the assembling of a domestic exported good Xt(f) and an
intermediate tradable good ZT
t (f) produced by foreign manufacturers. The production


















where  is the elasticity of substitution between foreign tradable goods and home exports
and  is the foreign economy bias parameter.
Each foreign distributor will set the demand for the export good produced in the SOE
and for the tradable goods produced in his country that minimises the cost of producing
the desired quantity of assembled good, subject to the technology constraint imposed by











t is the price of the exported good charged by domestic distributors, PT
t is the
price of the foreign tradable good and Y A
t is aggregate production of the foreign assembled
good. It should be noted that this equation is highly relevant to render the model dynam-
ically stable, namely due to a large elasticity to real exchange rate movements. The model
19operates de facto like a real model (or a fully credible xed nominal exchange rate model),
since domestic price levels are pinned down by the external constraint that uniquely sets
the real exchange rate in the steady state. Like the remaining foreign variables, both PT
t
and Y A
t are assumed to be independent of domestic developments.
Finally, some comments should be made concerning the external environment of PES-
SOA. Firstly, though restricting the RoW to the rest of the monetary union may be a
limiting assumption for the purpose of analysis in many euro area SOE, it does not seem
very stringent for scal policy analysis and allows for minimising the dimension of the
external block of the model. More specically, under this assumption one does not need
to explicitly model interactions between the euro area and the world excluding the euro
area. Obviously, this breakdown becomes clearly relevant in case one wants to assess the
impact on the domestic economy of shocks originated abroad, in particular if a high share
of external trade in goods and assets is done with countries outside the euro area. Sec-
ondly, while a country's exports in a multi-country model are endogenously determined by
imports demand of their trading partners, in a SOE model foreign economy developments
inuence the domestic economy signicantly, but are not inuenced by domestic economy
developments (Adolfson et al. 2007). Therefore, it seems reasonable to assume that foreign
demand and prices are exogenous, with endogenous movements in exports being simply
determined by real exchange rate uctuations.
3.6 Market clearing conditions and GDP denitions
The model relies on a set of equilibrium conditions, which ensure that all markets clear in
each and every period.







In the intermediate goods market, the output produced by each type of manufacturer
must meet demand by distributors and cover price adjustment and xed costs:
ZT
t = ZT C
t + ZT I
t + ZT G
t + ZT X
t +  PT







t + Tt!N (27)
In the nal goods market, the output supplied by each type of distributor must meet









t +  T I
t +  NI
t +  PI
t + Tt!I (29)
Y G
t = Gt +  PG
t + Tt!G (30)
Y X
t = Xt +  PX
t + Tt!X (31)






t Xt   P
t Mt + TREt (32)
Finally, nominal GDP is dened as:
GDPt = PtCt + PG
t Gt + PI
t It + PX
t Xt   P
t Mt (33)
while real GDP is dened as nominal GDP evaluated at the price levels prevailing in the
initial steady state .9
3.7 Calibration
PESSOA was calibrated using actual data of the Portuguese economy and information
from several studies on the Portuguese and euro area economies, including DSGE models.
The model parameters are presented in detail in Appendix A.
The data on the Portuguese economy was mainly taken from the Banco de Portugal
quarterly database (included in the 2009 Summer issue of the Economic Bulletin), and
from the National Accounts data released by Statistics Portugal. These data sources were
primarily used to pin down those parameters aecting the steady-state key macroeconomic
ratios. As reported in Appendix A, the model matches fairly reasonably the key ratios of
the Portuguese economy and delivers a plausible capital-to-output ratio.
Among the relatively large set of parameters and assumptions behind the model, it
seems worth mentioning that the steady-state real GDP growth was assumed to be iden-
tical in the entire monetary union, which ensures the existence of a balanced growth path.
The annual growth rate of the labour-augmenting productivity was set to 2%, which is
consistent with the available estimates for the potential output growth in the euro area
(Musso and Westermann 2005, Proietti and Musso 2007). This gure also seemed plausible
for Portugal (Almeida and F elix 2006). Regarding ination, the ECB ination objective
was assumed to be fully credible. Hence, the steady-state was solved under the assump-
tion that foreign ination stands at 2% per year. The euro area nominal interest rate
in the steady state was set to 4.5% (Coenen et al. 2007). The parameters related with
the Blanchard-Yaari households behaviour, namely the instant probability of death and
9This mimics the national accounts denition of GDP at reference year prices.
21Table 2: Benchmark scal package
(as a % of steady-state GDP)
Expenditure Revenue
Govt. Consumption + GFCF +0.36 Labour income tax -0.29
Targeted transfers to HH +0.09 Consumption tax -0.05
Transfers to rms +0.08 Corporate income tax -0.08
SS contributions -0.05
Fiscal balance -1.00
Source: authors calculations using OECD (2009).
the decay in productivity over the lifetime were calibrated as in Kumhof, Muir, Mur-
sula and Laxton (2010). The elasticities of substitution in the production functions of
manufacturers and distributors, the parameters governing the wage and price markups,
the adjustment costs, and the scal rule parameters were calibrated using Kumhof, Muir,
Mursula and Laxton (2010), Coenen et al. (2007) and estimates for Portugal, whenever
they were available.
4 Macroeconomic eects of alternative exit strategies
This section is focused on the macroeconomic eects of scal stimulus under alternative
exit strategies. The evaluation is conducted by a set of scal policy simulations using
the model presented in Section 3. The simulations are based on a specic scal stimulus
package (henceforth, the benchmark package) and rely on the assumptions of perfect
foresight, full credibility of the scal authority and no lags between the announcement
and programme implementation dates. It is also assumed from the outset that a specic
exit strategy is announced contemporaneously to the implementation of the benchmark
package and that all stimulus are temporary.10
The benchmark package is based on scal stimulus measures of developed economies
reported in OECD (2009). The stimulus is made of expenditure and revenue-based mea-
sures. The benchmark package corresponds to a re-scaling of the average gures reported
by a number of countries (Table 2). The scal block of the model is detailed enough to
account for all instruments reported in Table 2, with the exception of transfers to rms.
Thus, we assume that transfers to rms can be treated as an ad-valorem subsidy and,
therefore, the overall amount of corporate income tax cut plus transfers to rms was fed
into the model through the corporate income tax. The benchmark package was imple-
mented as a set of shocks in average tax rates and on Government expenditure levels.
The exit strategies considered herein can be split in two steps. The rst step is the re-
versal of the scal stimulus. The implementation of a temporary scal expansion is in line
with the literature that argues that a successful stimulus must be temporary, timely and
10Permanent shocks, alternative scal stimulus, implementation lags and credibility issues are discussed
in Almeida, Castro, F elix and Maria (2010).
22targeted (the so-called TTT requirement) and that permanent scal expansions, based for
instance on a permanent increase of Government expenditures, may bring about undesir-
able macroeconomic consequences over the medium run.11 In the benchmark simulation,
the reversal of the scal stimulus is assumed to occur after four quarters and the scal
expansion is fully nanced by debt issuance during a period of two years.12
The second step of the exit strategy is the consolidation process, which is of key
importance in this study. In the benchmark simulations, the consolidation starts in the
rst quarter of the third year, and corresponds to a temporary tax increase and/or an
expenditure cut. In the presence of a stimulus, the exit period only ends when the economy
returns to the initial steady state (and therefore the public debt ratio returns to the pre-
stimulus level).
In the benchmark simulations, the rst step of the exit strategy is always the same,
i.e. the benchmark package presented in Table 2 is reversed after four quarters. The
second step, however, is grounded on alternative scal instruments. This scheme allows
us to evaluate the impact of alternative exit strategies in terms of the most adequate
instrument to ground the consolidation process.
Figure 4 illustrates these two stages. Taking the steady-state as a baseline in which all
scal instruments are at =?, t0 represents the announcement and implementation date of
the scal stimulus programme.13 On this date, =? increases by , which corresponds to
the size of benchmark scal package, implemented with several instruments and implying
an increase in scal decit of 1% of the initial steady-state GDP. The scal package is fully
nanced by resorting to debt issuance as of t0. The second relevant date is t1 when the
scal stimulus ceases and, therefore, all scal instruments that were used to implement the
stimulus are reverted to their steady-state level, but the decit originated by the stimulus
keeps on being nanced through public debt issuance. This represents the rst step of the
exit strategy. Finally, the scal consolidation starts in t2, which represents the beginning
of the second step of the exit strategy. As presented in Section 3, from then onwards
at least one scal instrument adjusts endogenously to ensure that public debt reverts to
the target level and, more generally, all variables return to their initial steady state. The
outcome from alternative instruments is presented in subsection 4.1.
In subsection 4.2, the benchmark simulations are expanded so as to implement a sen-
sitivity analysis focused on the duration of the stimulus, timing and the aggressiveness of
the consolidation process. More specically, we consider, on the one hand, the possibil-
ity of a weaker consolidation eort (the \low eort" simulation). On the other hand, a
11Almeida, Castro, F elix and Maria (2010) obtains similar results for the the case of a SOE operating
in a monetary union.
12In practice, the fully nancing of the scal stimulus by resorting to debt issuance during a two years
period is achieved by switching o the scal rule during that period. The scal rule is switched on as
consolidation period starts. One should be aware, that switching o the scal rule might rise issues related
with the so-called time-inconsistency of optimal plans (Barro and Gordon 1983, Kydland and Prescott
1977). However, the discussion of the role of discretion is beyond the scope of this study. Nevertheless,
conclusions would be qualitatively similar in case scal policy rule is switched on.
13Recall that there are no implementation lags, i.e. there is no interval of time between the announcement
and the implementation of the stimulus.





t0 t1 t2 t3
Notes: t0 is the date when the scal stimulus is announced and implemented, and when the scal
policy rule is deactivated; t1 is the ending date of the stimulus; =? represents a steady-state scal
stance, created by all scal instruments, before the stimulus;  is the actual stimulus (it corresponds
to a benchmark package that implies an increase in the scal decit of 1% of steady-state GDP);
t2 corresponds to the starting date of the consolidation period in the benchmark scenario, dened
as a time when the scal policy rule is again fully operational. In all experiments, the time span
between t0 and t1, or t1 and t2 is assumed to be 4 quarters. After t2, the scal rule may be more or
less sensitive to deviations from steady-state gures. Finally, t3 is an alternative date to start the
consolidation period.
more protracted stimulus and a delayed consolidation will also be investigated (the \pro-
tracted" simulation). In both cases, the consolidation period is based on Government
expenditure cuts. The low eort scenario diers from the benchmark by a less aggressive
policy towards deviations from the debt target. Using Figure 4, this implies that scal
consolidation starts in t2, as in the benchmark scenario, but is completed later then in
the benchmark case. The low eort is implemented by lowering parameter d2 in equation
(22).
The protracted scenario corresponds to an extension of the stimulus for one year,
and a delay of one year in the beginning of the consolidation period. This means that the
stimulus is extended up to t2 and that consolidation starts in t3. For comparison purposes,
the sensitiveness of the scal rule to business cycle uctuations of the tax bases, assessed
by parameter d1 in equation (22), remains unchanged in this scenario.
4.1 Alternative scal instruments to complete the exit strategy
In this subsection, we assess the impact of alternative instruments in the scal consoli-
dation after the implementation of the benchmark package presented above. We start by
discussing the impact multipliers, which are the most commonly used measure to assess
the relevance of a scal stimulus (Blanchard and Perotti 2002, Canova and Pappa 2007).
We then focus on medium-run impacts, including the evolution of the \Present value mul-
tiplier" (PVM) for the main economic aggregates (Mountford and Uhlig 2009). The PVM
has already been used in the context of general equilibrium models (Leeper et al. 2009)
24and corresponds herein to the present discounted value of the impact of a 1 per cent scal
stimulus on selected variables, where the discount rate reects economic agent valuation
of current and future events.14
The impact multipliers under alternative scal instruments, dened as the average im-
pact in the year in which the stimulus is implemented, are reported in Table 3. The results
suggest that the impact multipliers on real GDP and expenditure components are largely
similar across all instrument used for the consolidation. This outcome reects essentially
that the composition of the benchmark stimulus package and the timing of the exit are
identical. The impact on GDP, private consumption and imports is consistently positive,
whereas the eect in private investment and exports is always negative. This implies
that a scal stimulus may be used to boost GDP or consumption over one year under
any exit strategy, at the cost of a partial crowding-out of investment and exports. The
impact multiplier is signicantly below unity, reecting the composition of the benchmark
package and the leakages associated to each component of the stimulus.15 The proximity
of all results implies that the impact multipliers are insucient to discriminate between
alternative scal policy instruments to ground the consolidation process. Recall that such
process is assumed to start two years after the beginning of the stimulus and one year
after the rst step of the exit strategy, which is simply characterized by the reversal of the
scal stimulus.
The impact of a scal stimulus package, even in the temporary case, goes well beyond
the short run. The necessary consolidation period is not nished with the reversal of the
stimulus, implying that the assessment of the macroeconomic impacts over the medium
run are also relevant. The impulse response functions and the PVM over a period of
ten years are depicted in Figures 5 and 6. The rst conclusion that can be drawn is
that the relatively similar macroeconomic eects over the short run, namely on the rst
year, become rather dierent over the medium run. The analysis of these dierences can
therefore be used to evaluate the scal instruments.
The adjustment path of selected macroeconomic variables over the reported horizon
puts in evidence that alternative scal consolidation strategies do yield dierent impacts in
real GDP, hours, private consumption, investment and exports, while impacts in imports
are somewhat closer. Exit strategies based on tax rate hikes lead to a more protracted
period of below-steady-state real GDP, private consumption and investment, hours and
exports, while exit strategies based on transfers or Government consumption cuts limit
these impacts (Figure 5). The PVM also conveys the idea that exit strategies based
on Government consumption and transfer cuts stand out with more positive medium-run
impacts in real GDP, as opposed to strategies based on labour income tax rate hikes, which
depict negative PVM from the third year onwards, or consumption taxes, which become
negative after the seventh year (Figure 6). In the case of private consumption and hours
14A brief description of the methodology behind the PVM is presented in Appendix B.
15The degree of leakages associated with each scal stimulus was assessed in Almeida, Castro, F elix and
Maria (2010).
25Table 3: Impact multipliers under alternative exit strategies
(deviation from steady-state)
l c G Trf
GDP 0.55 0.58 0.59 0.58
Consumption 0.71 0.78 0.77 0.76
Investment -0.23 -0.22 -0.24 -0.19
Exports -0.25 -0.27 -0.25 -0.25
Imports 0.38 0.40 0.41 0.41
Hours 0.75 0.78 0.79 0.78
Real wage rate 0.24 0.30 0.29 0.29
Real exchange rate -0.10 -0.11 -0.10 -0.10
Ination (in p.p.) 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.00
NFA (as a % of SS GDP) 0.14 -0.03 0.11 -0.09
Public debt (as a % of SS GDP) 0.26 0.39 0.27 0.45
Notes: NFA and Public debt deviations are in percentage
points. The remaining variables are in percentage. Higher real
exchange rate implies depreciation. The scal instruments are
labour income taxes (l); taxes on consumption goods (c);
Government consumption (G); and transfers (Trf).
worked, the PVM suggests that results based on Government consumption and transfer
cuts are also qualitatively similar to those obtained for real GDP; nevertheless, strategies
based on Government consumption cuts depict higher PVM than transfers regarding the
impact on private consumption, whereas the opposite occurs in the case of hours worked.
Figure 6 also indicates that strategies based on Government consumption cuts end up
producing positive PVM in private investment and exports, as opposed to the remaining
strategies. In the case of transfers cuts, the relative worse performance of exports and
private investment in terms of the PVM vanishes as the time horizon increases.
The dierent macroeconomic impacts of alternative scal instruments are conditional
on the amount of distortion implied by each instrument during the second step of the exit
strategy, i.e, during the consolidation process. The labour income tax is the most distor-
tionary instrument, while transfers (since they are distributed in a lump-sum fashion to
all households) and government consumption are the least, not aecting their inter/intra-
temporal decisions.
Finally, the impact on imports and net foreign asset position of all alternative scal
instruments is rather limited, against a background where exchange rate uctuations are
not sizeable. Nevertheless, one may point out that exit strategies based on labour in-
come tax rate hikes, lead to an increase in tradable goods ination and to a small real
exchange rate appreciation, thereby deteriorating international competitiveness, whereas
the opposite applies to Government consumption cuts.
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NFA
(as a % of SS GDP)
Note: Ination, NFA and Public debt deviations are in percentage points. The remaining variables
are in percentage. Higher real exchange rate implies depreciation.
Source: authors calculations using PESSOA.
On the nominal side, all exit strategies, but the one based on labour income tax, do
yield a marginal negative impact on ination prospects and a slight real exchange rate
depreciation in the third year, when the consolidation starts. In case a consumption
tax rate increase is used to consolidate, the direct impact in consumer prices leads to
higher ination, which does not fully translate into lower competitiveness, since it is only
partly reected in wage ination and therefore on nal goods prices and real exchange
rate developments.
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Source: authors calculations using PESSOA.
In general, exit strategies based on Government consumption cuts seems to dominate
the remaining options. This scal instrument was also found by Almeida, Castro, F elix
and Maria (2010) to be the one with the highest impact multiplier (close to unity). This
reects the fact that the production of the Government consumption good employs re-
sources that would otherwise be available for the private sector, creating demand side
pressures. Hence, any reduction of demand side pressures promotes a real exchange rate
depreciation and benets the international competitiveness of domestic rms. This eect
stimulates production and factor demand and osets, over the medium-run, the recession-
ary impacts of the scal consolidation. It should be noted that high trade elasticities is
a usual feature of SOEs (and a key variable to ensure a sustainable NFA position of a
SOE engaged in a monetary union). The results also reveal a decline in the real wage rate
when the scal policy rule is switched on, which is rapidly reverted, and an increase in
rm dividends and in the rental rate of capital, leading to a higher desired capital stock
level that pulls up investment over the simulation horizon. Finally, the evolution of pri-
vate consumption reects essentially limited income eects from the consolidation, related
with higher dividend income prospects, which osets the slight increase in real interest
rate implied by ination developments in a context of unchanged nominal interest rate.
Turning to exit strategies based on cuts in lump-sum transfers, the impacts in the
macroeconomic scenario bear several similarities with those reported for Government con-
sumption cuts. However, the consolidation of public debt aects the economy through
dierent transmission channels than those operating in the case of Government consump-
tion cuts. A cut in transfers hits the households budget constraint directly, creating pure
28negative income and wealth eects. This induces an increase in labour supply, which is
particularly strong in the case of liquidity constrained households, that cannot smooth
out the cut in transfers by trading in assets. The outward shift in the labour supply curve
implies ceteris paribus that households will demand a lower wage for the same amount
of supplied labour. Therefore, labour becomes cheaper than capital in relative terms and
rms' marginal costs decline. The impact in the relative price of labour motivates the more
rapid increase in hours and the less buoyant private investment than in the Government
consumption cuts case, despite a smaller increase in output (real GDP). In addition, the
slight gain in international competitiveness is the driver of the exports increase and of the
decline in the import content. On the nominal side, the slight decline in ination and the
real exchange rate depreciation reect mainly developments in rms' marginal costs over
the simulation horizon, despite improved demand conditions.
In turn, exit strategies based on tax increases imply a protracted decline of ouput, pri-
vate consumption and investment and hours to below steady-state levels over the medium
run (Figure 5). The results also present strong support that exit strategies based on labour
income tax hikes are the most penalising for real GDP, private consumption and invest-
ment and hours, since this tax is the most distortionary, aecting consumption/leisure
allocation of both asset holders and liquidity constrained households. On the contrary,
the consumption tax is far less distortionary of the consumption/leisure allocation, af-
fecting essentially the intertemporal consumption allocation of asset holders. Liquidity
constrained households are simply aected by wealth eects arising from the decline in
the real income, stemming from price developments.
Despite being very similar in many aspects, a raise in the labour income tax rate or in
the consumption tax rate include remarkable dierences in many aspects. In particular,
these taxes have dierent impacts on the magnitude of the consumption and ination
developments and on the real wage rate paid by intermediate goods producers against
the steady-state gures. Consumption tax rate changes aects the economy through the
price transmission channel, reducing the real value of households wealth and, therefore,
their consumption over the consolidation period. However, the decline in wealth induces
households to supply more labour in order to cushion the impact of the negative wealth
eect in consumption, particularly in the case of liquidity constrained households that
are not able to perform consumption smoothing by trading in assets. This explains the
smaller decline in hours worked than in the case of the labour income tax rise.
A labour income tax rise aects directly the consumption/leisure allocation, shifting
ceteris paribus the labour supply curve inwards. This means that households supply less
hours for the same real wage and, in this context, real wages need to increase to keep
hours worked at a proper level, inducing an increase in rms marginal costs. This is
passed to nal prices, leading to above steady-state ination and to a real exchange rate
appreciation, with impacts in competitiveness and trade, that aect demand prospects
in the medium-run. The strong negative impact in households wealth yields a decline
in private consumption, which coupled with the real exchange rate appreciation leads to
29lower demand prospects, inducing a decline in the desired capital stock and in private
investment.
A policy implication that can be derived from the previous analysis is that exit strate-
gies based on expenditure cuts seem to outperform the remaining options. Given this
implication, the rest of the article restricts the analysis to a consolidation period solely
based on Government consumption cuts.
4.2 Alternative timings to complete the exit strategy
To assess the importance of alternative timings to complete the exit strategy, two alter-
native scenarios will be implemented: (i) a weaker scal consolidation eort; and (ii) a
protracted stimulus and delayed consolidation. These scenarios will be called \low eort"
and \protacted" scenarios, respectively. As previously, all simulations are conducted under
the assumption of full credibility of the scal authorities, the benchmark package remains
unchanged, and all exit strategies are announced contemporaneously to the implementa-
tion of the scal stimulus programme. However, the consolidation process is fully based
on Government expenditure cuts, which seemed to be a somewhat dominant exit strat-
egy in the previous subsection. The outcome of both scenarios will be confronted with
the results of the exit strategy based on Government consumption cuts (the \reference"
scenario), obtained in subsection 4.1.
The low eort scenario diers from the one considered in the previous subsection by
considering that the scal consolidation process can be prolonged in time. The protracted
scenario corresponds to a stimulus that is prolonged for two years and that the second
step of the exit strategy only occurs in the very beginning of the fourth year (a one year
delay in comparison with the refernce case).16
The impact multipliers for the alternative scenarios are presented in Table 4. The
results suggest that the short-run impacts are largely independent of alternative timings
to complete the exit strategy. Private investment is the variable that shows some dier-
ences in relative terms. Its sensitiveness reects essentially the impact of exit timings in
demand prospects over the medium term, and the importance of forward-looking elements
in investment decisions resulting from capital stock adjustments (which are subject to
adjustment costs).
As in the previous section, the assessment changes as the analysis is focused on macroe-
conomic impacts over longer time periods. This impact is depicted in Figure 7 and the
PVMs are presented in Figure 8. In comparison with the reference scenario, all agents of
the economy adapted their optimal behaviour, as expected, to the new scal policy func-
tion, which includes a less sensitive response when debt deviates from target, or to the
new scal stimulus, which is implemented over a longer period (although still temporary).
Contrary to the reference scenario, the low eort strategy does not yield a real exchange
16Technically, the low eort scenario corresponds to changing parameter d2 of equation (22) from the
benchmark calibration of 0:1 to virtually zero; in the protracted scenario, the scal rule parameters remains
unchanged.
30Table 4: Impact multipliers for alternative exit timings
(deviation from steady-state)
Reference Low eort Protracted
GDP 0.59 0.60 0.55
Consumption 0.77 0.80 0.78
Investment -0.24 -0.21 -0.43
Exports -0.25 -0.29 -0.31
Imports 0.41 0.43 0.36
Hours 0.79 0.79 0.73
Real wages rate 0.29 0.31 0.31
Real exchange rate -0.10 -0.12 -0.12
Ination (in p.p.) 0.00 0.02 0.03
NFA (as a % of SS GDP) 0.11 0.11 0.13
Public debt (as a % of SS GDP) 0.27 0.26 0.26
Note: Ination, NFA and Public debt deviations are in percentage
points. The remaining variables are in percentage. Higher real ex-
change rate implies depreciation.
Source: authors calculations using PESSOA.
rate depreciation over the medium-run. This implies that the impacts of a consolidation
process based on Government consumption cuts on trade variables (and in production)
cease to be in place. Liquidity constrained households are less aected than in the reference
scenario, since the scal authorities actions, which are allowed to trade in assets, somehow
compensate the eects that can emerge due to their impossibility to smooth consumption.
In this sense, a prolonged adjustment limits the volatility of consumption and economic
activity and might well be benecial for liquidity constrained households. The smoothing
of the scal adjustment is made at the cost of a higher crowding-out of investment, a larger
and more persistent public debt stock increase, extending in this simulation beyond the
ten-years horizon, and also a deteriorating net foreign asset position. One should however
be aware that if the scal authorities do not enjoy perfect credibility, the situation might
be less benign, the risk premium of the economy may rise and the balance of costs and
benets just presented might well be changed for the worse (Almeida, Castro, F elix and
Maria 2010). The results support therefore the conclusion that the announcement of a
promptly and timely exit strategy, to be completed over a relatively short period of time,
may circumvent eventual adverse eects from limited credibility.
In the case of the protracted stimulus and delayed consolidation scenario, the results
point to a stronger positive impact in real GDP in the second and third years, in compari-
son with the reference scenario. This is due to the fact that Government consumption cuts
only occur from the fourth year onwards, and explains the lower level of real GDP in that
year in comparison with the remaining scenarios. The delay of the negative impacts in real
GDP, hours and private consumption reects essentially the mechanism described above,
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Public debt
(as a % of SS GDP)
Notes: Ination, NFA and Public debt deviations are in percentage points. The remaining vari-
ables are in percentage. Higher real exchange rate implies depreciation.
Source: authors calculations using PESSOA.
which is largely based on the impact of the scal consolidation in liquidity constrained
households, since they cannot smooth their consumption. In addition, the delayed sce-
nario has less benign impacts in real exchange rate and private investment developments,
reecting the impact of a more protracted appreciation during the scal stimulus period.
However, the reverse occurs in the consolidation period, since the stimulus is on aggregate
twice as large as in the reference scenario, implying that the amount of debt to consoli-
date is also twice as large, but the consolidation eort is the same, in the sense of being
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Source: authors calculations using PESSOA.
close to the steady-state position in the tenth year. This implies stronger Government
consumption cuts that will lead to a stronger decline in real GDP, hours and consumption
(as the scal consolidation starts) and to a sharper real wage adjustment (and, hence,
to a sizeable real exchange rate depreciation). Although the increase in public debt is
much higher than in the reference scenario, since the stimulus is in place during two years
(instead of one year, as in the reference scenario), the impact in private consumption is
not since asset holder smooth their consumption by resorting to asset trade; conversely,
liquidity constrained households consumption prole is much more bumpy, leading to a
more erratic prole in private consumption and hours than in the reference scenario. If
the scal authorities do not enjoy full credibility, the spike in public debt levels may also
backre the initial objectives behind the scal stimulus, namely if the risk premium in-
creases (Almeida, Castro, F elix and Maria 2010). The results also support the conclusion
that a promptly and timely exit strategy seems to be a desirable policy option.
The PVMs reveal that if the Government is basically concerned with medium run
impacts then real GDP and imports do not change signicantly across alternative exit
timings. The protracted scenario reveals a larger medium-run positive impact in private
consumption and hours, while yielding a negative impact in private investment. The low
eort scenario is far less benign, since it does not have a visibly dierent impact even
over the medium-run in private consumption or hours worked and crowds out visibly
private investment and exports, since the real exchange rate does not depreciate over the
consolidation period.
33The main policy implication we can draw from alternative timings to complete the exit
strategy is that, if the Government enjoys full credibility, there are no signicant dierences
in terms of real GDP impacts. The eects in nal demand composition might nevertheless
be non-negligible. For instance, weak consolidation strategies tend to limit real exchange
rate depreciation associated to Government consumption cuts and, therefore, crowding
out exports and investment signicantly. In addition, it leads to a deterioration in the
scal balance and in the current account, giving rise to twin decits, and to a deteriorating
public debt and net foreign asset position. In regular operating conditions, these might well
be second order eects, however, it might trigger a rise in the interest rate risk premium in
a nancial distress environment, as the one reported in Figure 3. In this case, the impacts
are clearly less benign (Almeida, Castro, F elix and Maria 2010). Although the protracted
and delayed scenarios end up raising the same issue, it should be noted that, in the last
case, these issues only arise before the second step of the exit strategy, though in more
exuberant way, whereas in the case of a weak consolidation strategy this type of concerns
is prolonged in time and may hamper Government credibility as time passes by.
5 Conclusions
The scal activism to cope with the deepest economic and nancial crisis since the Great
Depression led to major imbalances in advanced economies. Although these imbalances
need to be corrected at some point in time, there is a great deal of uncertainty around
the impact of exit strategies. This article addressed the case of a small-open economy,
integrated in a monetary union, and investigates if there is a dominant consolidation
strategy both in terms of scal instrument and timing, using a dynamic general equilibrium
model with non-Ricardian features.
The results suggest that the impact multipliers, which are biased to focus on short-
term developments, are insucient to discriminate among the alternatives and therefore
do not convey an adequate metric. On the contrary, a medium and longer term assessment
can in fact be used to shed some light on the ongoing discussion on how and when should
Governments consolidate their scal sector position, after a demanding scal stimulus.
The results suggest that the macroeconomic scenario resulting from alternative exit
strategies may change non-negligibly, in particular in what respects external trade vari-
ables, since real exchange rate plays a crucial role in macroeconomic adjustment in a
context of xed nominal interest and exchange rates. Conditional on a benchmark scal
stimulus package, based on OECD data, an exit strategy based on Government consump-
tion cuts seems in general to outperform the remaining scal policy options, namely those
based on tax hikes on labour income or on nal consumption goods, or lower transfers
to households. Once the scal authority pre-announces a consolidation strategy based
on Government consumption cuts, this fosters for instance a competitive disination. In
turn, consolidation strategies based on tax hikes induce a real exchange appreciation that
hinders international competitiveness and implies a net foreign asset deterioration.
34Concerning the alternative timings to complete the exit strategy, the results suggest
that the impacts in the macroeconomic scenario may dier qualitatively in terms of the
expenditure composition. In particular, a faster consolidation may foster exports and
private investment at the cost of lower private consumption and higher volatility of demand
and hours worked. The results are far less distinguishable in terms of the impact in output.
It is worth mentioning that the results are conditional on full credibility of the scal
authorities, however, if that is not the case, the impact of the a scal stimulus might be
very limited, if any, as discussed in Almeida, Castro, F elix and Maria (2010). One must be
aware that a delay in the scal consolidation or a weak consolidation eort that prolongs
the scal consolidations might raise concerns on the credibility of the scal authorities
and trigger an sovereign risk premium hike. Therefore, the economic activity impact from
a scal stimulus, without hampering scal authorities credibility, is conditioned on the
announcement of a promptly and timely exit strategy.
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39Appendices
A Model calibration
This appendix reports in some detail the calibration of the model parameters reported in
Table 1. As reported in the main text, the model matches fairly reasonably the key ratios
of the Portuguese economy and delivers a plausible capital-to-output ratio by industry
standards, as depicted in Table 2.17
The calibration of households parameters took into consideration the fact that the
model features Blanchard-Yaari overlapping generations, instead of the innitely-lived
agents framework. These parameters were therefore largely based on Fagan, Gaspar and
Pereira (2004), Harrison et al. (2005) and Kumhof and Laxton (2007). A and B were
calibrated so as to ensure that the elasticity of labour supply to real wage is 0:5, a value
commonly found in the literature. Since the Blanchard-Yaari overlapping generations
households framework allows for an endogenous determination of the net foreign asset
position, the discount rate was calibrated to ensure a net foreign debt position of 60%
of GDP in the steady state. The coecient of relative risk aversion was set to calibrate
the inter-temporal elasticity of substitution to 0:2, which might seem a low gure in
comparison with the values typically used in innitely-lived agents models, but is in the
range of the values regularly used in models featuring Blanchard-Yaari households. The
share of liquidity constrained households was set to 40%, broadly in line with the estimates
for Portugal presented in Castro (2006).
Concerning the labour unions parameters, we considered a 25% steady-state wage
markup, which is at the upper limit of the values usually found in the literature. Note,
however, that since the labour market in Portugal is strongly regulated, one may argue that
the markup could be even higher than the gures usually found in the DSGE literature.
Nominal wage rigidity was calibrated to ensure that wages adjust to the new equilibrium
in 6 quarters, a value slightly above euro area estimates published in Coenen et al. (2007),
but still in the range usually found in the literature.
Turning to manufacturers, the depreciation rate was assumed to be identical across
rms and was calibrated to get the investment-to-GDP ratio in line with the National
Accounts data. As regards the production function, a standard Cobb-Douglas function
between capital and labour was assumed and the distribution parameters were calibrated
to match the labour income share in the National Accounts data. The steady-state price
markup of tradable and non-tradable goods was calibrated using OECD product mar-
ket regulation indicators and the correlation between tradable and non-tradable goods
markups and product market regulation indicators found in Hj, Jimenez, Maher, Nico-
letti and Wise (2007). In particular, the price markup of the non-tradable goods was
set to 20%, which is at the upper bound of the range of values commonly found in the
literature, but consistent with the evidence pointing to low competition in the Portuguese
17The Portuguese National Accounts do not include gures for the capital stock.
40Appendix - Table 1: Main parameters
Parameter Value
Monetary union parameters
Euro area interest rate (annualised) i
 1.05
Euro area labour-augmenting prod. growth (annualised) g 1.02
Euro area ination target (annualised) 
 1.02
Euro area EoS between domestic and imported goods 
 2.50
Households and Unions
Households discount rate (annualised)  0.97
Intertemporal elasticity of substitution
1
 0.20
Households instant probability of death (annualised) 1    0.04
Households habit persistence  0.70
Consumption share - Type A households A 0.74
Consumption share - Type B households B 0.66
Lifetime productivity decline rate (annualised) 1    0.04




Wage rigidity - Adjustment cost U 200
Manufacturers
Depreciation rate (annualised)  0.09
EoS between capital and labour J 0.99
Price markup - tradables
T
T  1 1.10
Price markup - non-tradables
N
N 1 1.20
Capital adjustment cost IJ 10
Labour adjustment cost UJ 5
Price adjustment cost PJ 200
Quasi labour income share - tradables T 0.56
Quasi labour income share - non-tradables N 0.60
Distributors
EoS domestic tradable/imported good AF 1.50
EoS assembled/non-tradable good F 0.50
Price markup (domestic distributors)
F




Import content adjustment cost AF 2
Price adjustment cost PF 200
Government
Labour income tax rate L 0.23
Consumption tax rate C 0.31
Capital income tax rate K 0.17
Employers' social security contribution rate SP 0.19
Debt to GDP ratio (annualised)
b
gdp 0.53
Fiscal stance parameter d1 1.00
Speed adjustment towards the target debt ratio parameter d2 0.10
41Appendix - Table 2: Steady-state key ratios
Data Model
Expenditure (as a % of GDP)
Private consumption 0.64 0.61
Government consumption and GFCF 0.22 0.21
Private investment 0.21 0.21
Exports 0.29 0.29
Imports 0.37 0.33
Labour income share (as a % of overall income) 0.57 0.56
Tradable goods 0.54 0.54
Non-tradable goods 0.58 0.58
Capital-output ratio (as a % of output) NA 2.34
Tradable goods NA 2.53
Non-tradable goods NA 2.21
Government (as a % of GDP)
Debt stock 0.57 0.53
Fiscal balance -0.07 -0.02
Overall revenues 0.38 0.39
Overall expenditure 0.45 0.41
External account (as a % of GDP)
Net foreign assets -0.60 -0.60
Current account -0.06 -0.02
Trade balance -0.08 -0.04
42non-tradable goods market. As for real rigidities, capital adjustment costs were calibrated
so as to ensure plausible impulse responses in terms of investment volatility. Regarding
nominal rigidities, price growth adjustment costs were calibrated to match average adjust-
ment time spans, in line with what is suggested in the literature. In particular, we impose
that the adjustment of prices in the non-tradable goods sector is slightly slower than in
the tradable goods sector, reecting the fact that ercer competition and lower markups
imply lower price stickiness.
We now consider distributors parameters. In the assemblage stage, the elasticity of
substitution between domestic tradable goods and imports was taken to be identical across
distributors and set above unity, as in most of the literature on open economy DSGE
models (see for instance Coenen et al. (2007), Harrison et al. (2005), Erceg et al. (2000)
or Kumhof, Muir, Mursula and Laxton (2010)); on the other hand, in the distribution
stage, assembled goods (which are basically a composite tradable good) and non-tradable
goods were assumed to feature a low substitutability as in Mendoza (2005) and Kumhof,
Muir, Mursula and Laxton (2010). The distribution parameters of the production function
in each stage were calibrated to match the National Accounts import content and non-
tradable goods content of each type of nal good. The degree of monopolistic competition
among distributors was assumed to be lower than among manufacturers, with the steady-
state markup being set to 5%, except in the case of exporters, where ercer competition
is likely to determine a lower markup. In terms of price stickiness, it was assumed that
prices take 2 quarters to fully adjust for all distributors except exporters, whose prices
are assumed to adjust faster. Real rigidities related to the import content adjustment
costs were set to ensure a smooth adjustment of import contents to real exchange rate
uctuations.
The steady-state tax rates were calibrated to match the average revenue-to-GDP ratios
observed in the data. The same applies to EU transfers and to expenditure components
(government consumption and investment and government transfers). The parameters
of the scal policy rule were calibrated to ensure a smooth tax adjustment. The target
debt-to-GDP ratio in the steady state was set to 53%, implying a corresponding scal
balance-to-GDP ratio of  2:1%.18
18The values assumed for the debt-to-GDP target and the implied scal balance can be questioned
in view of the medium term objective that has been set by the European Commission for Portugal (a
structural budget balance of  0:5%, implying a debt-to-GDP ratio close to 12%). However, since in the
historical period that was used to calibrate the model the debt-to-GDP ratio averaged 57%, it does not
seem reasonable to calibrate it to match a remarkably dierent gure.
43B Present value multipliers
The present value multiplier (PV M) is computed following the proposal by Mountford
and Uhlig (2009) that has already been used in the context of general equilibrium models
(Leeper et al. 2009). For any variable of interest, the assessment delivered by the present








where ^ Yt refers to deviation from steady-state of variable Y in period t, ^ sgt refers to
deviation from steady-state of scal balance-to-GDP ratio in period t and  stands for
the household discount factor  adjusted by , the degree of myopia. Typical candidates
for Y can be, for instance, GDP or private consumption.
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